Forensic audit reveals how Ghana’s Embassy in the U.S. extorted $19.3m from visa and passport applicants

A forensic audit by Ghana’s Auditor-General has uncovered a major consular services scandal at Ghana’s Embassy in Washington, D.C., involving nearly US$19.4 million in irregular charges imposed on visa and passport applicants between 2019 and 2025.

The audit found that thousands of applicants who believed they were using official government channels were allegedly redirected from the embassy’s website to privately controlled digital platforms, where they were charged additional fees for passport and visa processing support and the return of their documents.

The findings have raised serious concerns about financial controls, cybersecurity, procurement, oversight and the management of Ghana’s consular operations in the United States.

The investigation comes after growing complaints about delays, missing passports, unclear fee structures and other irregularities at the embassy, which contributed to the temporary closure of the mission in 2025 following concerns raised by US authorities and Ghanaian officials.

According to the forensic audit, Ghana’s visa and passport services are ordinarily processed through official government platforms, including the Electronic Consular Information Management System (eCIMS) and AppTrack.

These systems are designed to manage applications, record transactions and ensure that statutory fees are collected through authorised channels.

However, the audit found that this process was allegedly undermined by the manipulation of the embassy’s official website and the introduction of external platforms that redirected applicants to additional payment channels.

Applicants accessing the embassy’s website were allegedly redirected to privately controlled platforms where they were required to pay US$29.75 for the return of their passports or visas.

The Auditor-General estimated that the actual average postage cost was about US$10.10, meaning applicants were paying almost US$20 more than the estimated cost of mailing their documents.

The audit described the arrangements as enabling the collection of dispatch and mailing charges as well as application support service fees from applicants.

The mailing and dispatch arrangements constituted one of the largest components of the irregular financial transactions identified by the audit.

Data obtained from the embassy's systems showed that more than 170,000 visa mailing transactions, alongside thousands of passport dispatches, were processed during the period under review.

According to the audit, applicants paid a total of US$6,945,554 in mailing and dispatch fees.

After deducting the estimated actual postage cost of US$2,357,986.40, the excess generated from mailing charges alone amounted to approximately US$4,587,567.60.

The report said the embassy discontinued the use of self-addressed return envelopes in 2023, meaning applicants no longer had an alternative way of arranging the return of their documents.

Instead, applicants were required to pay a fixed mailing fee regardless of the actual cost of postage.

The audit identified another stream of irregular charges involving application support services.

Applicants were reportedly required to pay US$67 for passport applications and US$76.78 for visa applications through external platforms.

The Auditor-General said these charges were presented as necessary for completing applications even though they were not part of officially approved government consular fees.

The audit also identified additional merchant charges associated with the use of the Square payment platform, despite the absence of a formal contract governing its use.

These additional fees further increased the amount paid by applicants and contributed to the financial irregularities uncovered by investigators.

Overall, the forensic analysis identified transactions amounting to US$21,337,446.70 connected to the activities under investigation.

After accounting for estimated actual costs of approximately US$2.36 million, the remaining US$19.37 million was classified by the Auditor-General as irregular.

The audit also uncovered significant operational failures at the embassy.

Between June and August 2025, the mission reportedly accumulated a backlog of 12,721 visa and passport applications.

Of that number, only 4,507 applications were mailed, while 8,214 were either collected personally by applicants or remained undelivered.

The development meant applicants who had already paid for document delivery still experienced substantial delays.

The Auditor-General said the situation suggested that dispatch fees collected from applicants may not have been used for their intended purpose.

The embassy subsequently incurred an additional cost of approximately US$45,000 to post letters and clear part of the accumulated backlog.

This expenditure was incurred despite applicants having already paid mailing charges through the system.

The forensic audit identified Fred Kwarteng, an Information Technology Officer at the embassy, as having created and operated several external platforms allegedly linked to the system.

Among the platforms identified were TravelGhana.Net and GhanaPV.org, alongside entities including Ghana Travel Consult, Secure Data Centre LLC, Travel Global and MFG Technology.

According to the report, some of these platforms were linked to or replicated aspects of the official embassy systems.

Applicants were allegedly redirected from the embassy’s official website to these platforms and instructed to make payments for postage and application support services.

The platforms also reportedly used official symbols and presentation styles that could give applicants the impression that they were authorised government platforms.

The Auditor-General said the redirects were implemented directly within the embassy website’s source code, suggesting that administrative-level access had been used.

The audit also examined the roles of senior embassy officials during the period in which the external platforms and payment arrangements operated.

Joseph Ngminebayihi, who served as Minister (Consular) from 2017 to 2021, was responsible for consular operations during the early stages of the third-party arrangements.

His successor, Amidu Mohammed Karande, served from 2021 to 2025, during which the use of external platforms allegedly continued within the embassy's official workflows.

The report also examined the role of Alima Mahama, who served as Ghana's Ambassador to the United States from 2021 to 2024.

According to the Auditor-General, Mahama, in her capacity as Ambassador and Head of Mission, exercised supervisory and financial authority over the embassy and signed a contract between the mission and Travel Ghana/Secure Data Centre.

The audit said the contract formalised the outsourcing of passport and visa dispatch services to entities linked to the system while unauthorised charges were imposed on applicants.

The report further raised concerns about related-party transactions, banking compliance and weaknesses in governance controls during the period under review.

The Auditor-General's investigation concluded that weak internal controls and inadequate oversight created an environment in which unauthorised platforms and staff-linked entities could operate alongside Ghana's official consular systems.

The report said the manipulation of the embassy website, the creation of parallel digital platforms and compulsory redirection of applicants were central to the scheme.

It further stated that staff-linked entities were allowed to handle passport dispatch, visa-processing communications and payment arrangements without adequate authorisation or oversight.

The findings have therefore raised broader questions about cybersecurity and financial controls within Ghana's foreign missions, particularly where digital platforms are used to deliver public services.

The Auditor-General has recommended that the irregular funds be recovered from the individuals identified as key actors in the arrangements.

The report also recommended that officers found culpable should face appropriate sanctions under Ghana's Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038).

The findings are expected to intensify scrutiny of the management of Ghana's diplomatic missions and the use of private contractors and digital platforms in the delivery of government services.

The Washington embassy case also highlights the need for stronger controls over government websites, digital payment systems, procurement arrangements and the collection of fees from citizens seeking public services abroad.

For thousands of Ghanaian visa and passport applicants, the audit raises a troubling question: how long were they paying charges they believed were official before the system came under scrutiny?

The Auditor-General's findings now place the responsibility on the relevant authorities to determine accountability, recover public and applicant funds where appropriate, and ensure that Ghana's consular services operate through transparent, secure and properly authorised systems.